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Defective Incorporation: De Facto
Corporations, Corporations by
Estoppel, and Section 21-2054
I INTRODUCTION
Private litigants have often attempted to call into question the
legal existence of a corporation which is an opposing party to a
lawsuit. In Nebraska, corporate existence begins when the articles
of incorporation are filed and recorded with the secretary of state.1
Almost all states have similar statutes identifying the commence-
ment of corporate existence.2 The major incidents of corporate
existence are the ability of the corporation to sue and be sued and
the limited liability of the shareholders. 3 Through the use of the
common law doctrines of de facto corporations and corporations
by estoppel, a corporation may be held to exist in certain circum-
stances in which the statutory conditions precedent to corporate
existence have not been achieved. However, recent statutory
changes 4 have been construed as precluding the application of
these two common law doctrines. 5 This comment will discuss
1. "Upon the filing and recording in the office of the Secretary of State of the
original articles of incorporation, corporate existence shall commence." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 21-2054 (Reissue 1977).
2. See, e.g., CA. CORP. CODE §§ 200, 209 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-2-104
(1973); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 106 (1974); IOWA CODE § 496A.51 (1962); KAN. STAT.
§§ 17-6005, -6006 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.075 (Vernon Supp. 1979); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 403 (McKinney 1963); S.D. ComPILED LAws ANN. § 47-2-7
(1967); Wyo. STAT. § 17-36.48 (1965). See also 2 AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION,
MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 56 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MODEL ACT ANN.].
3. 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 15-20 (1959). Conversely,
if there is no de jure or de facto corporation, the shareholders are generally
liable as partners. 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 3772 (rev. perm. ed. 1966). Cf. Elson v. Schmidt, 136 Neb. 778, 287
N.W. 196 (1939) (an association lacking corporate existence takes title as a
partnership to property transferred to it).
4. See 2 MODEL ACT ANN. §§ 56, 146 (discussion of identical or comparable state
statutes).
5. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. 1964). See 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3,
§ 3890:
One of the reasons for enacting the modern corporation statutes was
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these two common law doctrines, their application under the
Model Business Corporation Act,6 and the possible effect of Sec-
tion 21-2054 of the Nebraska Statutes. 7 In particular, the analysis
will focus on the situation in which a plaintiff creditor attempts to
challenge the legal existence of a corporate debtor and thereby
hold the shareholders individually liable.8
I1. BACKGROUND
Early in our history distrust of corporations led to the enact-
ment of statutes which set forth detailed prerequisites to recogni-
tion of corporate status.9 These statutes presented a problem for
courts when corporate existence was challenged for failure to com-
ply with all formal requirements. In order to uphold the existence
of the challenged corporation, the de facto corporation and corpo-
ration by estoppel doctrines came into being.10
to eliminate problems inherent to the de jure, de facto and estoppel
concepts. Moreover, the authorities which have considered the prob-
lem are unanimous in their belief that the section of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act which states that the certificate of
incorporation will be "conclusive evidence" that all conditions prece-
dent have been performed eliminates the problems of estoppel and
de facto corporations once the certificate has been issued.
Id. at 191-92. But see note 64 & accompanying text infra.
6. 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 56, 1 4.04, at 210; id. § 146, 2., at 908 (Comment).
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2054 (Reissue 1977). See note 1 supra. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has not construed the effect of this statute on the de facto
corporation and corporation by estoppel doctrines.
8. This comment will not deal with the problem of which shareholders and/or
directors will be held liable. See, e.g., Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267
Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973). Throughout this comment the term "sharehold-
ers" will be used to refer to the parties that the court may hold liable for the
debts of the defective corporation. For an analysis of whether the sharehold-
ers should be liable as co-partners, see Dodd, Partnership Liability of Stock-
holders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1927); Lewinsohn,
Liability To Third Person Of Associates In Defectively Incorporated Associa-
tions, 13 MICH. L REv. 271 (1915); Magruder, A Note On Partnership Liability
of Stockholders In Defective Corporations, 4 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1927). See
generally I-. BALLANTiNE, BALLANTINE ON COR'ORATiONS 91-96 (rev. ed. 1946).
9. N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CoRPORATIONS 197 (2d ed. 1971). Nebraska, for exam-
ple, required recording the articles of incorporation with the clerk of the
county where the business was to be transacted and with the secretary of
state. A corporation was also required to publish notice of the name, princi-
pal place of business, general nature of business, amount of and conditions
on the capital stock authorized, time of commencement and termination,
amount of indebtedness to which the corporation would subject itself, and
the names of the officers. In addition, the corporation was required to post
the by-laws in a conspicuous place where it transacted business. Finally, the
corporation was required to annually publish notice of its existing debts. See
NEB. Com. STAT. ch. 16, §§ 126, 130-136 (1881) (repealed). For a discussion of
statutory requirements imposed in Nebraska today, see § IV-A of text infra.
10. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 444-45 (D.C. 1964).
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A de jure corporation is one created in substantial conformity
to the governing corporation statutes and whose corporate exist-
ence is therefore invulnerable to both an attack by private litigants
and a quo warranto attack by the state.' The focus of the defini-
tion depends upon substantial, and not necessarily total, compli-
ance with all mandatory conditions precedent to incorporation.12
A de facto corporation, on the other hand, is one in which the stat-
utory requirements of incorporation have not been substantially
complied with, yet is recognized as a corporation for all purposes
except a direct attack by the state.13 The significance of applying
the de facto doctrine is that the corporation may still sue and be
sued while its shareholders retain their limited liability.14
The traditional elements of the de facto doctrine are (1) a valid
law under which such a corporation may be formed; (2) a bona
fide or good faith attempt to organize thereunder; and (3) an ac-
tual user of the corporate franchise.15 In addition, it is sometimes
stated that there must be "colorable compliance" with the require-
ments of such incorporation statutes. 16 However, to require "color-
able compliance" is just another way of stating, in different terms,
11. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3760, at 38 & n.5. Cf. Parks v. James J. Parks
Co., 128 Neb. 600, 602, 259 N.W. 509, 510-11 (1935) ("A corporation de jure has
been defined by this court as one whose right to exercise a corporate function
would prove invulnerable if assailed by the state in quo warranto proceed-
ings.").
12. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CoRPoRATIoNs 239 (2d ed. 1970); N. LAT-
TiN, supra note 9, at 183-84. Although the corporation may have complied
with all conditions precedent, it may still be subject to a suit by the state for
noncompliance with conditions subsequent to incorporation. Id. at n.11. See
also notes 70-71 & accompanying text infra.
13. -8W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3761, at 38; id. § 3846, at 139-40; H. HENN, supra
note 12, at 239. The de facto doctrine should not be confused with any theory
of ultra vires. The latter relates only to the powers of a corporation, assuming
already that the corporation "exists." 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3764, at
43.
14. But see Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
1153, 1154 (1952): "[O]ne cannot logically determine that the members of an
association are or are not personally liable for their association's debts by
first arriving at a conclusion that the association should or should not be la-
belled a corporation ......
15. Tulare Ir. Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 13 (1902); Theis v. Weible, 126 Neb. 720,
727, 254 N.W. 420, 423 (1934); H.J. Hughes Co. v. Farmers Union Produce Co.,
110 Neb. 736, 739, 194 N.W. 872, 873 (1923); Lusk v. Riggs, 70 Neb. 713, 721, 102
N.W. 88, 89 (1904); Haas v. Bank of Commerce, 41 Neb. 754, 757, 60 N.W. 85, 86
(1894).
16. See, e.g., Baum v. Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954); Han-
sen v. Village of Ralston, 147 Neb. 251, 22 N.W.2d 719 (1946); Parks v. James J.
Parks Co., 128 Neb. 600, 259 N.W. 509 (1935). But see 53 MICH. L. REv. 283, 285
(1954) (suggesting that after Baum, Nebraska courts no longer require the
elements of bona fide attempt to organize or colorable compliance with the
law).
1979]
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that there must be a bona fide or good faith attempt to organize. 17
The de facto doctrine is founded upon two main public policy
considerations. 18 First, the merits of a controversy are seldom af-
fected by the corporate existence of a party to the suit where all of
the traditional elements of the de facto doctrine have been met.
Second, if any rights and franchises have been usurped, they are
the rights and franchises of the state, and only the state may ob-
ject.19 The de facto doctrine enables the court to balance the pol-
icy of discouraging unauthorized assumptions of corporate status
against the conflicting policy of upholding the security of transac-
tions with a corporation.20 In Theis v. Weible,2 1 the Nebraska
Supreme Court offered the following rationale:
The rule is in the interest of the public and is essential to the safety of
business transactions with corporations. It would produce disorder and
confusion, embarrass and endanger the rights and interests of all dealing
with the association, if the legality of its existence could be drawn into
question in every suit in which it is a party or in which rights were in-
volved springing out of its corporate existence.
2 2
Although the de facto doctrine appears to be flexible in its ap-
plication,2 3 it has been the subject of severe criticism.24 There are
at least two major difficulties with the de facto corporation analy-
sis.25 First, the de facto doctrine and its composite elements26 fail
to reveal what acts will be sufficient to constitute "substantial com-
17. See 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3777, at 51-52; H. HENN, supra note 12, at
240.
18. H. HENN, supra note 12, at 240; 53 MICH. L. REv. 283, 284 (1954). See 1 G. HORN-
STEIN, supra note 3, § 27: "The decisions and the de facto doctrine are based
on the theory that fairness to the parties as well as normal business activities
require that a purported corporation shall be treated as such... ." Id. at 27.
19. See, e.g., Abbott v. Omaha Smelting & Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416, 420
(1876) ('This doctrine seems to be founded upon the principle, that the exist-
ence of such corporation, acting under color of a franchise, cannot be ques-
tioned in a suit where it would only arise collaterally, because the state, the
party chiefly concerned, could not be heard by counsel.").
20. Note, Corporations-De Facto Corporations-Estoppel-Model Business Cor-
poration Act, 43 N.C. L. REv. 206, 207 (1964).
21. 126 Neb. 720, 254 N.W. 420 (1934).
22. Id. at 727, 254 N.W. at 423.
23. Baum v. Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954) (finding a de
facto corporation when the law authorizing such a corporation did not occur
until 19 years after the other elements satisfying the de facto doctrine-a
bona fide attempt to organize and user of the corporate franchise-were
achieved).
24. See H. BALANImrE, supra note 8, at 71 ("a discouraging and baffling maze");
Frey, supra note 14, at 1180 ("legal conceptualism at its worst"); Note, supra
note 20, at 207 ("confusing and unpredictable state of the law"); 2 MODEL ACT
ANN. § 146, 2., at 908 (Comment) ("concept of de facto incorporation, which
at best was fuzzy").
25. Frey, supra note 14, at 1156.
26. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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pliance" with the corporation laws. Moreover, if there is not sub-
stantial compliance, the doctrine does not specify what acts are
sufficient to constitute a "bona fide attempt" to organize or "colora-
ble compliance" with the corporation laws. Second, the de facto
doctrine does not give any indication of the legal consequences of
failure to meet one of the traditional elements. It has been sug-
gested that it is not possible to predict all the legal attributes of a
corporation by simply looking to one defect in the incorporation
process and deciding whether the acts done were sufficient for a de
jure or de facto corporation to come into being.27 A major consid-
eration, fairness to the parties, 28 evidenced by the factors of
whether or not the creditor dealt with the association on a corpo-
rate basis and whether the individual shareholders were active in
the management of the corporation,29 is seldom mentioned by the
courts as an underlying rationale, yet appears to affect the ultimate
decision on shareholder liability.30
The de facto corporation doctrine is entirely separate and un-
connected with the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.3 1 A de
facto corporation "is a reality .... and [has] substantial legal
existence. ' 32 A corporation by estoppel is, on the other hand, no
corporation at all; it applies only to a particular transaction. The
corporation by estoppel doctrine states simply that private liti-
gants may, by their agreements, admissions, or conduct, place
themselves in situations in which they will be estopped to deny
the legal existence of a corporation.33 It has been held that there
27. Frey, supra note 14, at 1156:
This traditional approach blandly assumes that merely by consider-
ing the character or extensiveness of the defect in the effort to incor-
porate, it is possible to predict all of the legal attributes which courts
will ascribe to the associates .... But I suspect that it is not possi-
ble to foretell with assurance even the presence or absence of a sin-
gle attribute, such as limited liability of the associates, merely by
dwelling upon the factual content of a particular defect in the at-
tempt to incorporate and the policies underlying the unfulfilled stat-
utory requirement.
28. I. HENN, supra note 12, at 241.
29. Frey, supra note 14, at 1157-58.
30. Id. at 1175: "[1]t appears that the factor of dealings on a corporate basis is of
major importance .... Moreover,. . .where the dealings were on a corporate
basis, it develops that the managing associates fare to a minor degree dis-
cernably worse than those inactive in the management."
31. 8 W. FRTCHER, supra note 3, § 3763, at 42-43. Cf. note 30 supra (dealings on a
corporate basis). The corporation by estoppel doctrine, however, has been
held to depend on whether a de facto corporation was created. See text ac-
companying notes 34-35 infra.
32. Kleckner v. Turk 45 Neb. 176, 188, 63 N.W. 469, 472 (1895), 8 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 3, § 3762, at 40. A corporation cannot be both de jure and de facto
at the same time. Id. § 3766, at 44.
33. 8 W. FLTCHER, supra note 3, § 3889, at 191. The corporation by estoppel doc-
1979]
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can be no estoppel where there is not even a de facto corporation.34
However, commentators agree that the better rule is to allow es-
toppel without reference to whether a de facto corporation exists
because to do otherwise would render the corporation by estoppel
doctrine superfluous.35
The corporation by estoppel doctrine is typically applied in
three different fact situations:3 6 (1) where the defective corpora-
tion is being sued and the shareholders attempt to deny its corpo-
rate existence at the time the contract was executed;37 (2) where
trine may also be defined as follows: one who contracts and deals with an
association as a corporation is estopped to deny its corporate existence. See
United States Tire Dealers Mut. Corp. v. Laune, 139 Neb. 26, 28, 296 N.W. 333,
335 (1941); Retail Merchants' Serv. v. John Bauer & Co., 125 Neb. 61, 64, 248
N.W. 813, 814 (1933); Societe Titanor v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 124 Neb.
570, 573, 247 N.W. 356, 358 (1933); American Gas Constr. Co. v. Lisco, 122 Neb.
607, 609-10, 241 N.W. 89, 90 (1932); Crete Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Patz, 1 Neb.
UnofE 768, 769, 95 N.W. 793, 793 (1901); Otoe County Fair & Driving Park Ass'n
v. Doman, 1 Neb. Unoff. 179, 180, 95 N.W. 327, 328, (1901); Equitable Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Bidwell, 60 Neb. 169, 82 N.W. 384 (1900) (court syllabus); Ne-
braska Nat'l Bank of York v. Ferguson, 49 Neb. 109, 114, 68 N.W. 370, 372 (1896)
(dicta); Livingston Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68 N.W. 375
(1896) (court syllabus). Cf. N. LATrIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CoRPoRA-
TIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 105-06 (4th ed. 1968) (distinguishing promoters'
contracts on the ground that in a normal promoter's contract the third party
creditor is advised that incorporation has not yet occurred). In this regard,
see Sherwood & Roberts--Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 269 Or. 389, 525 P.2d 135
(1974).
34. Trenton Dressed Poultry, Inc. v. Jamson, Inc., 116 N.J. Super. 327, 282 A.2d 405
(1971) (per curiam); Puro Filter Corp. v. Trembley, 266 A.D. 750, 41 N.Y.S.2d
472 (1943); Conway v. Samet, 59 Misc. 2d 666, 300 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1969); James v.
Unknown Trustees, 203 Okla. 312, 220 P.2d 831 (1950).
35. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3902, at 201; N. LATrIN, supra note 9, at 190
('The justification of this view may well be that the state is not as much con-
cerned with a good faith assumption of corporateness as it is in seeing that
justice is done between the parties concerned."); Comment, Estoppel To
Deny Corporate Existence, 31 TENN. L. REv. 336, 338 (1964) ("[D]ecisions re-
quiring de facto existence before allowing an estoppel argument are more
likely to be disguised repudiations of the doctrine... ."). See, e.g., Bukacek
v. Pell City Farms, Inc., 286 Ala. 141, 145, 237 So. 2d 851, 853, cert. denied, 401
U.S. 910 (1970); Willis v. City of Valdez, 546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alas. 1976); Sunman-
Dearborn Community School Corp. v. Kral-Zepf-Freitag & Assocs., - Ind.
App. -, -, 338 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1975). See also Edward Shoes, Inc. v. Oren-
stein, 333 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ind. 1971); Childs v. Philpot, 253 Ark. 589, 487
S.W.2d 637 (1972); Cranson v. IBM, 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964) (possibility
of de facto corporation not mentioned by the court); Timberline Equip. Co. v.
Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973).
36. See H. BALLANTiNE, supra note 8, at 69; Comment, supra note 35, at 336.
37. See, e.g., Gilligan v. John Gilligan Co., 94 Neb. 437, 143 N.W. 457 (1913). See
also Caroline Realty Inv., Inc. v. Kuniansky, 127 Ga. App. 478, 194 S.E.2d 291
(1972) (no dealings on a corporate basis); Pacific Intermountain Express Co.
v. Best Truck Lines, Inc., 518 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1974); Schneider v. Best
Truck Lines, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1971).
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the corporation is suing and the defendant denies the corpora-
tion's legal existence at the time the contract was executed;3 8 and
(3) where the shareholders are sued individually by a third party
creditor of the alleged defective corporation.3 9 Distinguishing
these situations is crucial in determining when the corporation by
estoppel doctrine will be applied by the courts. The first two situa-
tions have been dealt with by statute in some jurisdictions,40 al-
though this type of provision is not prevalent today.4 1 It is
apparent that only the first situation involves the elements of a
true estoppel, i.e., reliance induced by the misrepresentation of the
party against whom the estoppel is asserted.42 However, the cor-
38. See, e.g., United States Tire Dealers Mut. Corp. v. Laune, 139 Neb. 26,296 N.W.
333 (1941); Societe Titanor v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 124 Neb. 570, 247
N.W. 356 (1933); American Gas Constr. Co. v. Lisco, 122 Neb. 607, 241 N.W. 89
(1932); Lincoln Butter Co. v. Edwards-Bradford Lumber Co., 76 Neb. 477, 107
N.W. 797 (1906); Crete Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Patz, 1 Neb. Unoff. 768, 95 N.W.
793 (1901); Otoe County Fair & Driving Park Ass'n v. Doman, 1 Neb. Unoff. 179,
95 N.W. 327 (1901); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bidwell, 60 Neb. 169, 82
N.W. 384 (1900); Livingston Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68
N.W. 375 (1896). See also Childs v. Philpot, 253 Ark. 589, 487 S.W.2d 637 (1972)
(no estoppel); Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1966); Zimmerman
Ford, Inc. v. Cheney, 132 Ill. App. 2d 871, 271 N.E.2d 682 (1971).
39. See, e.g., H.J. Hughes Co. v. Farmers Union Produce Co., 110 Neb. 736, 194
N.W. 872 (1923); Nebraska Natl Bank of York v. Ferguson, 49 Neb. 109,68 N.W.
370 (1896); Kleckner v. Turk, 45 Neb. 176,63 N.W. 469 (1895); Abbott v. Omaha
Smelting & Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416 (1876). See also Harris v. Stephens
Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 54 Ala. App. 405, 309 So. 2d 115 (1975) (no deal-
ings on a corporate basis); Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. 1964); Akel v.
Dooley, 185 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho
373, 414 P.2d 879 (1966); Anzalone v. Durchslag, 1 IlM App. 3d 125, 273 N.E.2d
752 (1971) (no dealings on a corporate basis); Sunman-Dearborn Community
School Corp. v. Kral-Zepf-Freitag & Assocs., - Ind. App. -, 338 N.E.2d 707
(1975) (contract action against successor to "shareholder" liabilities); Cran-
son v. IBM, 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964); Timberline Equip. Co. v. Daven-
port, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973) (no dealings on a corporate basis).
40. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1,117 (Reissue 1962) (repealed by the 1963 Ne-
braska Business Corporation Act, discussed at § IV-A of text infra):
No corporation operating or organized under this act shall be permit-
ted to set up, or rely upon the want of legal organization as a defense
to any action against it; nor shall any person transacting business
with such corporation, or sued for injury done to its property, be per-
mitted to rely upon such want of legal organization as a defense.
This section shall not be construed to prevent judicial inquiry into
the regularity or validity of the organization of the corporation or its
lawful possession of any corporate power it may undertake to assert
in any other suit or proceeding where its corporate existence or the
power to exercise corporate rights it asserts is challenged, and evi-
dence tending to sustain such challenge shall be admissible in any
such suit or proceeding.
See also DEL CODE tit. 8, § 329 (1974); Ch. 49, § 21, 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws (re-
pealed ch. 69, § 1, 1975 Ariz. Sess. Laws) (effective July 1, 1976).
41. See 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 56, 1 3.03(3) (d), at 208.
42. See H. BAI L'N~mE, supra note 8, at 92-93; N. LA rm, supra note 9, at 190.
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poration by estoppel doctrine may still be applied in the latter two
situations under what one commentator has termed a "loose" es-
toppel.4 3 By dealing on a corporate basis, the third party is held to
have "admitted" the legal existence of the corporation.44 It has
been suggested that a more realistic analysis of the third situation,
in which a creditor of the defective corporation attempts to hold
the shareholders individually liable, is to consider the limited lia-
bility of the shareholders as an implicit term of the contract.4 5
Under this analysis, the use of the term "company" 46 or "corpora-
tion" implies limited liability on the part of the shareholders.
Therefore, execution of the contract includes a concurrent agree-
ment to look only to the corporation for the specified performance.
This analysis, however, may also be questioned.
The state of mind of one who agrees to limit the liability of another, which
but for such agreement would be absolute, is plainly different from the
state of mind of one who accepts as true another's erroneous statement
that his liability is limited by law and deals with him on that assump-
tion.4 7
Under either analysis, there can be no corporation by estoppel
where the conduct of the shareholders is just as consistent with
the status of an unincorporated association as with that of a corpo-
ration.4
The corporation by estoppel doctrine is founded on principles
43. N. LA=r, supra note 9, at 190. In the second situation, in which a corporate
plaintiff is suing a third party, the defendant cannot be said to have made any
representation to the corporation that the corporation had legal existence or
that the shareholders have relied on any such representation. Yet it would
be unfair to the parties and against public policy if the defendant could assert
lack of corporate existence to escape liability. This result is expressed by
stating the defendant is "estopped" to raise the issue. In the third situation,
in which a creditor is suing the individual shareholders, the creditor made no
representation that the corporation was duly incorporated and had legal
existence; but the defendant shareholders have been protected from liability
in some cases by finding that the creditor is "estopped" to deny the legal
existence of the corporation.
44. Retail Merchants' Serv. v. John Bauer & Co., 125 Neb. 61, 63, 248 N.W. 813, 814
(1933) (citing W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3910, at 245).
45. Comment, Corporations, 10 VnL. L. REv. 166, 167 (1964). See Dodd, supra
note 8, at 554; Lewinsohn, supra note 8, at 284.
46. The term "company" is sufficient to charge a person with notice that the busi-
ness may be incorporated and imports a corporation until the contrary is
shown. See, e.g., Caroline Realty Inv., Inc. v. Kuniansky, 127 Ga. App. 478, 194
S.E.2d 291 (1972).
47. Dodd, supra note 8, at 554.
48. Retail Merchants' Serv. v. John Bauer & Co., 125 Neb. 61, 64, 248 N.W. 813, 814
(1933) (use of the name, "Retail Merchants' Service," was just as consistent
with an unincorporated association as with a corporation). Cf. Societe Tita-
nor v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 124 Neb. 570, 247 N.W. 356 (1933) (admis-
sion of the corporation's legal existence may occur subsequent to the
execution of the contract). See generally H. BALLANT , supra note 8, at 89.
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of equity. As such, it should not apply where'the result would be
inequitable.49 Although application of the corporation by estoppel
doctrine, like the de facto doctrine, avoids inquiry into often irrele-
vant formalities and fosters procedural convenience, it too has
been criticized in the situation in which the individual sharehold-
ers of a defective corporation are sued by a third party creditor.50
Besides the fact that the creditor extended credit on a misunder-
standing of fact for which the shareholders were responsible,51 the
criticism is founded on the policy that it is unjust to place the bur-
den on the non-negligent party.52 In other words, the persons who
form a corporation to insulate themselves from individual liability
should bear the responsibility of seeing that the corporation has
complied with all conditions precedent to legal existence. More-
over, it would appear unreasonable to require third party creditors
to examine corporate records every time they deal with a corpora-
tion. Finally, it would be contrary to public policy to encourage
shareholders to be ignorant or indifferent to the formalities of
49. The corporation by estoppel doctrine should not apply when the person as-
serting the estoppel knows of the defect. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3914,
at 232-34. Assuming ignorance of the defect, the first of the two situations
described at notes 37-39 & accompanying text supra, the equities are fairly
obvious. In the first, the true estoppel situation, the corporation has obtained
the benefit of the contract and is attempting to escape its liability. It also
seems equitable in the second situation for a third party who has benefitted
from a contract to be held liable for its just debts owed the corporation,
whether defective or not.
50. See Comment, supra note 45, at 111; Comment, De Facto Incorporation and
Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REv. 1121, 1144-
49 (1977); Note, Liability Under Defectively Organized Corporations, 26 MD.
L. REV. 354, 359 (1966). Cf. Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE
L.J. 875, 886 (due to the minimal acts necessary to form a corporation today,
statutes should be enacted to make filing an absolute prerequisite to limited
liabilty, thereby abolishing the de facto and estoppel doctrines). Contra, N.
LATriN, supra note 9, at 170-75; Note, supra note 20, at 210.
51. See, e.g., Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 71-72, 514 P.2d 1109,
1112 (1973):
The creditor-plaintiff contracted believing it could look for payment
only to the corporate entity. The associates ... believed their only
potential liability was the loss of their investment in the supposed
corporate entity and that they were not personally liable....
From the plaintiff-creditor's viewpoint, such reasoning is some-
what tenuous. The creditor did nothing to create the appearance that
the debtor was a legal corporate entity. The creditor formed its in-
tention to contract with a debtor corporate entity because someone
associated with the debtor represented, expressly or impliedly, that
the debtor was a legal corporate entity.
See also note 43 supra.
52. Although situations could exist in which the failure of the corporation to at-
tain legal existence may be due totally to the negligence of someone other
than the shareholders, the third party creditor is still the "least negligent"
party.
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forming a corporation when they could achieve limited liability to
creditors53 by merely carrying on business in a corporate-sounding
name.54
The remainder of this comment will explore the possible effects
of the Model Act 55 and Section 21-2054 of the Nebraska Statutes 56
on the situation in which a third party creditor attempts to hold the
shareholders of a defective corporation individually liable.57
IM THE VALIDITY OF THE DE FACTO CORPORATION AND
CORPORATION BY ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES
UNDER THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Section 56 of the Model Act provides that corporate existence
begins upon issuance of the certificate of incorporation and that
that certificate is conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent
have been performed.5 8 The effect is twofold. First, any acts taken
short of obtaining a certificate of incorporation would not consti-
tute a bona fide attempt to organize, thus precluding application of
the de facto doctrine.59 Second, any pre-recordation defects or ir-
regularities are cured since issuance of the certificate signifies
compliance with all conditions precedent. There is, therefore, no
53. The shareholders would, however, be interested in complying fully with the
corporation laws when the business entered into carried with it the potential
of great tort liability since the injured plaintiff will not have dealt with the
association as a corporation and could not be estopped.
54. Dodd, sup a note 8, at 556-57. See, e.g. Akel v. Dooley, 185 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1966).
55. 2 MODEL AcT ANN. § 56, at 205.
56. NEn. REV. STAT. § 21-1054 (Reissue 1977). See note 1 supra.
57. The corporation by estoppel doctrine should remain viable in the first two
typical situations, where the defective corporation is named as the defendant
and where the corporation is the plaintiff. See Comment, supra note 50, at
1149-51. MODEL AcT § 146 has no application under these circumstances, see
note 61 infra, and equity requires application of the doctrine. Courts which
have interpreted the Model Act provisions and broadly stated that the cor-
poration by estoppel doctrine is eliminated have caused confusion on subse-
quently recognizing the doctrine in the two circumstances described above.
See text accompanying notes 84-86 infra.
58. 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 56, 1 1., at 205 (Model Act Provision):
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate
existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be
conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be per-
formed by the incorporators have been complied with and that the
corporation has been incorporated under this Act, except as against
this State in aproceeding to cancel or revoke the certificate of incor-
poration or for involuntary dissolution of the corporation.
59. Id. T 2., at 205 (Comment): "Under the unequivocal provisions of the Model
Act, any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation would not con-
stitute apparent compliance. Therefore a de facto corporation cannot exist
under the Model Act."
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need to apply the de facto doctrine to protect shareholders from
pre-recordation defects. 60 Furthermore, section 146 of the Model
Act mandates joint and several liability for all persons who act as a
corporation without first obtaining the certificate of incorporation
provided for under section 56.61 The comment to section 146 puts
to rest any notion that the de facto doctrine remains viable:
[T]he effect of section 146 is to negate the possibility of a de facto corpora-
tion.
Abolition of the concept of de facto incorporation, which at best was
fuzzy, is a sound result. No reason exists for its continuance under gen-
eral corporate laws, where the process of acquiring de jure incorporation
is both simple and clear. The vestigial appendage should be removed.62
The states that have enacted provisions identical or comparable
to the Model Act 63 and have considered the issue, have, for the
most part, agreed with the Model Act commentary that the de facto
doctrine has been abolished.6 It is important to note that there
60. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3762.1, at 41.
61. 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 146, 1., at 908 (Model Act Provision): "All persons who
assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly and
severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result
thereof."
62. Id. T 2., at 908-09 (Comment).
63. See 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 56, 3., at 206-8; id. § 146, 3., at 909 (Statutory Provi-
sions).
64. Cargill, Inc. v. American Pork Producers, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 876, 880 (D.S.D.
1976) (dicta) (statute comparable to § 146 held designed to preclude de facto
doctrine); Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 299 n.28 (Alas. 1972) (dicta) (statutes
comparable to §§ 56, 146); Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 447 (D.C. 1964)
(statutes comparable to §§ 56, 146); Cahoon v. Ward, 231 Ga. 872, 874, 204
S.E.2d 622, 624-25 (1974) (statutes comparable to §§ 56, 146); Sherwood & Rob-
erts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 269 Or. 389, 393, 525 P.2d 135, 137 (1974) (stat-
ute comparable to § 146 held designed to preclude de facto doctrine);
Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 69, 514 P.2d 1109, 1110-11 (1973)
(statutes comparable to §§ 56, 146). See also 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3; 1
G. HoRNST~im, supra note 3, § 29 at 30-31; Folk, supra note 50, at 886. But see
Sunman-Dearborn Community School Corp. v. Kral-Zepf-Freitag & Assocs.,
- Ind. App. -, 338 N.E.2d 707 (1975) (dicta) (statute comparable to § 56; rec-
ognition of de facto doctrine without discussion); Montana Ass'n of Under-
writers v. State, 563 P.2d 577 (Mont. 1977) (statutes comparable to §§ 56, 146;
recognition of de facto doctrine without discussion); Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 202,407 P.2d 683 (1965) (statutes comparable to
§§ 56, 146; recognition of de facto doctrine). See also N. LA=rr, supra note 9,
at 220 ("[I]f the statute merely makes the filing with an administrative offi-
cial, such as the secretary of state, or the obtaining of a certificate presump-
tive or prima facie evidence of corporateness, the whole business of de facto
corporations and of estoppel remains except that the burden of proof has
been shifted."); Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corpora-
tion Act, 1 U. CHI. L REV. 357, 380 (1934) (discussing Illinois statute compara-
ble to § 56):
This provision by which the certificate of incorporation estab-
lishes corporate existence largely supersedes the necessity of resort-
ing to the common law doctrines of de facto corporations and of
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may be other statutory conditions to the commencement of busi-
ness by the corporation,65 yet these do not affect the courts' deter-
mination of corporate existence. For example, in Robertson v.
Levy,66 the court, in discussing state laws identical to sections 56
and 146 of the Model Act,67 stated that other corporation laws re-
quiring payment of minimum capital into the corporation 68 (which
could be no less than $1,00069) played no part in determining
whether a de jure corporation had been formed.7 0 These are condi-
tions precedent to doing business, but are conditions subsequent
to corporate existence. The de jure and de facto corporation dis-
tinctions are appropriate when the corporate existence is chal-
lenged; they are not applicable to additional requirements that
must be complied with before the "commencement of business."'
The state may, of course, require the corporation to comply with
corporations by estoppel where there is some defect or irregularity in
the incorporation papers or proceedings leading up to the issue of the
certificate. In the case of foreign corporations, however, and corpora-
tions which attempt to organize but fail to file the articles with the
secretary of state or to obtain a certificate of incorporation, such doc-
trines may need to be invoked.
65. See, e.g., ABA-ALI, MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 51, at 183 (1960):
A corporation shall not transact any business or incure any indebted-
ness, except such as shall be incidental to its organization or to ob-
taining subscriptions to or payment for its shares, until there has
been paid in for the issuance of shares consideration of the value of
at least one thousand dollars.
This provision was later eliminated; however, section 56 and section 146 [then
sections 49 and 139] were then construed as eliminating the de facto doctrine.
See also IL. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 49, Comment at 355. Section 49 (ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.49 (Smith-Hurd 1954)) is comparable to section 56 of the
Model Act. Illinois requires a county filing (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.48
(Smith-Hurd 1954)), yet the failure to record the certificate of incorporation
with the county does not affect the de jure status of the corporation.
66. 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. 1964).
67. D.C. CODE § 29-921c (1973) (see section 56, note 58 supra); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 29-950 (1973) (see section 146, note 61 supra).
68. D.C. CODE § 29-921d (1973).
69. Id. § 29-921a(f).
70. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 446 n.13 (D.C. 1964). See also Folk, supra
note 50, at 886 ("Assuming that a corporation is duly formed, the newer stat-
utes usually disable it from doing business before a minimum amount of cap-
ital is paid in.") (emphasis added).
71. See H. HENN, supra note 12, at 239:
The corporation assumes a de jure character once there is substan-
tial compliance with all mandatory conditions precedent to
corporateness-such as filing the articles of incorporation. This is
true even though conditions classified as conditions precedent to car-
rying on business-such as election of directors, or subscription
and/or payment of minimum capital-are not met.
See also 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 3737, at 4-10; N. LTvrIN, supra note 9,
at 200 ("[T]he statute may set up other conditions precedent before com-
mencing business with the imposition of a penalty if the condition is violated.
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these provisions; but this would not appear to be an attack on the
corporation's legal existence.7 2
At the same time, jurisdictions that have statutes requiring the
filing and/or recording of the articles of incorporation or some
other document before commencement of corporate existence7 3
have generally held that even if the de facto doctrine has not been
vitiated, at least there could be no de facto corporation without
such filing.7 4 As under the Model Act,7 5 there can be no colorable
compliance or bona fide attempt to organize when such a minimal
requirement is not met. And where the filing of the articles of in-
corporation or other document is the only act specified by statute
as a condition precedent to corporate existence, it is submitted
that the de facto doctrine no longer has any application.7 6
The Model Act comments to sections 56 and 146 do not state
how those sections might affect the doctrine of corporation by es-
toppel. In Robertson v. Levy,77 however, the court construed provi-
sions identical to sections 56 and 146 as putting "to rest de facto
corporations and corporations by estoppel."78 There, a contract
and note for the sale of a business was executed between a seller
and a corporate purchaser nine days prior to the issuance of the
certificate of incorporation. The corporation became insolvent. Al-
though the seller believed he was dealing with a corporation and
intended to do so, the court held the shareholder of the defective
corporation liable:
We hold, therefore, that the impact of [sections 56 and 146], when consid-
ered together, is to eliminate the concepts of estoppel and de facto
corporateness .... It is immaterial whether the third person believed he
was dealing with a corporation or whether he intended to deal with a cor-
Under these statutes the corporation already has acquired its legal existence,
or should have.").
72. H. HENN, supra note 12, at 239 n.11. See, e.g., III. AxN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.82,
.100 (Smith-Hurd 1954) (failure to file articles with the county may result in
fine or dissolution). See also 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 94, at 531.
73. See 2 MODEL ACT ANN. §§ 56, 146 (Statutory Provisions).
74. See Terrell v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ariz. App. 468,472,508 P.2d 355,359 (1973)
(dicta) (in 1976, Arizona adopted statutes comparable to the Model Act); Al-
len Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89 Idaho 29, 36, 402 P.2d 394, 397 (1965); John
Davis & Co. v. Cedar Glen Four, Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 214, 220-21, 450 P.2d 166, 170
(1969). See generally Annot., 37 AJ.LR. 1319 (1925); Annot., 22 A.L. 376
(1923). See also Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supp. Co., 54 Ala. App.
405, 309 So. 2d 115 (1975); Childs v. Philpot, 253 Ark. 859, 487 S.W.2d 637 (1972).
75. 2 MODEL ACT ANN. §§ 56, 146. See notes 58 & 61 supra.
76. See Folk, supra note 50, at 885 ("Particularly in a jurisdiction which only re-
quires central filing, invoking the defacto doctrine on the basis of something
less than filing would violate the statutory purpose.").
77. 197 AK2d 443 (D.C. 1964).
78. Id. at 446.
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poration. The certificate of incorporation provides the cut off point; before
it is issued, the individuals, and not the corporation, are liable.7 9
Although the result appears equitable, a great deal of gloss has
been added to the Robertson decision with regard to the Model Act
provisions. In Timberline Equipment Co. v. Davenport,80 a creditor
attempted to hold the shareholders liable on a contract executed
by the corporation before the certificate of incorporation was is-
sued. One defense asserted was the corporation by estoppel doc-
trine. Offered the opportunity of confirming what Fletcher has
stated to be the "unanimous" authority,8 ' the court declined to de-
cide the validity of the doctrine in Oregon, finding instead that
even if the doctrine were recognized, the creditor had not believed
it was contracting with a corporate entity.82 The court seemed to
question the Robertson decision on the grounds that the District of
Columbia court had later recognized the corporation by estoppel
doctrine.83 In Namerdy v. Generalcar,84 the court that decided
Robertson stated that by dealing with a corporation, one is es-
topped to deny its legal existence.85 However, it is important to
recognize that in Namerdy, a defendant debtor was attempting to
deny the existence of a corporate plaintiff creditor, a situation in
which application of the corporation by estoppel doctrine appears
to reach the equitable result.86
Other jurisdictions have also continued to recognize the corpo-
ration by estoppel doctrine, often without reference to corporation
laws determining corporate existence. 87 For example, in Cranson
v. IBM,8 8 the court applied the doctrine of corporation by estoppel
79. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). Accord, Cahoon v. Ward, 231 Ga. 872, 875, 204
S.E.2d 622, 625 (1974) (dicta) ("Without the re-enactment of ... [a specific
estoppel statute], we perceive that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel as
well as de facto corporations would have been eliminated and 'put to rest."').
See also 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 50, at 1138 ("the
two sections probably eliminate estoppel").
80. 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973).
81. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3.
82. Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 72, 514 P.2d 1109, 1112-13
(1973)..
83. Id. at 69 n.1, 514 P.2d at 1111 n.l.
84. 217 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1966).
85. Id. at 112.
86. See notes 36-39, 49 & accompanying text supra. The elimination of the corpo-
ration by estoppel doctrine in the District of Columbia was subsequently re-
affirmed in Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 416 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C.
1976).
87. See Edward Shoes, Inc. v. Orenstein, 333 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (dicta);
Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 54 Ala. 405, 309 So. 2d 115
(1975); Allen Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89 Idaho 29, 402 P.2d 394 (1965);
Sunman-Dearborn Community School Corp. v. Kral-Zepf-Freitag & Assocs.,
- Ind. App. -, 338 N.E.2d 707 (1975); Cranson v. IBM, 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33
(1964).
88. 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964).
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to prevent liability on the part of a corporate shareholder who had
contracted in the corporate name for the purchase of typewriters
prior to the filing of the corporation's certificate of incorporation.
Maryland laws contained a provision somewhat similar 89 to section
56 of the Model Act, but nothing similar to section 146.90 Although
the court failed to mention its own corporation laws, it has been
suggested that the absence of a Maryland statute similar to section
146 was, and is, important in determining the validity of the corpo-
ration by estoppel doctrine:
[The Cranson] result seems appropriate so long as the statute does not
impoe partnership liability ... Absent legislative clarity on the matter,
sectidn [56] should be read only as stating that after a certain event the
corporation "exists," but not as implying that, in all other circumstances,
limited liability is precluded. Without the equivalent of section [146], sec-
tion [56] should not be construed as ipso facto removing the traditional
discretionary power of courts to decide particular cases so as to imple-
ment reasonable expectations and promote the security of transactions. 9 1
Absent the possible distinction above, there appears to be no
clear authority on when the corporation by estoppel doctrine will
be applied. Courts and commentators have "gone all over the
lot"92 in defining and applying the doctrine, and its application in
Nebraska requires further inquiry into Nebraska statutes and case
law.
IV. THE VALIDITY OF THE DE FACTO AND CORPORATION
BY ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES IN NEBRASKA
A. The Nebraska Statutes
After five years of study, the Nebraska Business Corporation
Act was enacted in 1963.93 Its purpose was to revise and modernize
89. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 131(b) (1957).
Upon acceptance for record by the Department of any articles of in-
corporation, the proposed corporation shall, according to the pur-
poses, conditions and provisions contained in such articles of
incorporation, become and be a body corporate by the name therein
stated. Such acceptance for record shall be conclusive evidence of
the formation of the corporation except in a direct proceeding by the
State for the forfeiture of the charter.
90. See notes 58 & 61 supra.
91. Folk, supra note 50, at 885-86.
92. Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 70, 514 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1973).
93. L.B. 173, ch. 98, 1963 Neb. Laws. The last major revision of the corporation
laws had occurred in 1941. These prior statutes required dual filing, but there
was no provision expressly stating when corporate existence commenced.
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-107 to -109 (Reissue 1962) (repealed by L.B. 173, ch.
98, 1963 Neb. Laws). The ambiguous wording of the statutes in regard to cor-
porate existence caused confusion among lawyers. Bloomingdale, Articles of
Incorporation Under the New Act, 43 NEB. L REV. 426, 436 (1964).
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the general Nebraska statutes on corporations. 94 The Nebraska act
was patterned generally after the Model Act.95 However, unlike
the Model Act, Nebraska originally required dual filing to achieve
corporate existence. Section 21-2054 provided that "[ulpon record-
ing in the office of the county clerk the duplicate original of the
articles of incorporation bearing the date of filing in the office of
the Secretary of State, corporate existence shall commence." 96 It
seems possible that, as originally enacted, section 21-2054 provided
a situation that could require the courts' use of the de facto doc-
trine. Assume, for example, that a corporation filed its original ar-
ticles of incorporation with the secretary of state, but failed to
subsequently file a certified duplicate original with the county
clerk. The act of filing with the secretary of state would seem to
indicate a bona fide attempt to organize, or a colorable compliance
with the law. Assuming there was a valid law under which to in-
corporate and user of the corporate franchise,97 a de facto corpora-
tion could result. The legislative history indicates there was some
question of whether dual filing was an appropriate condition prece-
dent to corporate existence. Senator Luedtke, speaking at a Judi-
ciary Committee meeting, appeared to recognize the de facto
problem.
Sections 54 and 62 of the act: They have spelled out what the effect of the
recording of the articles of incorporation in the County Clerk's office is-it
is contrary to the Model Act. In many instances it wil carry out the Ne-
braska law today, rather than the Model Act. It makes it mandatory that
the Articles of Incorporation be filed in the County Clerk's office before it
94. Comm. on Judiciary, Introducer's Statement of Purpose, L.B. 173, Neb. Leg.,
73d Sess. (Feb. 6, 1963):
The objective of this committee has been to provide Nebraska with a
modern, up-to-date complete business corporation act which will
meet today's requirements and contribute to the economic develop-
ment of our state. The committee feels that the recommended Act
embodies and adapts to our needs the developments and improve-
ments that have occurred in this field during the last twenty years.
See L.B. 173, floor debate at 1012. Senator McGinley, the introducer, stated
that the concern over the prior corporation laws was brought about, in part,
by the following article: Luedtke, Nebraska Corporation Law, A Statutory
Jungle, 36 NEB. I- REV. 368 (1957).
95. L.B. 173, floor debate at 1012 (Senator McGinley, introducer); Comm. on Judi-
ciary, Minutes, IB. 173, Neb. Leg. 73d Sess. 3 (Feb. 11, 1963) (remarks by Mr.
Bert Overcash, chairman of bar association committee that drafted the act):
"The states around us have adopted similar acts: Wyoming, Iowa, Colorado,
Utah and others." The states specifically noted have statutes identical or
comparable to sections 56 and 146 of the MODEL ACT.
96. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2054 (1963) (amended 1965). See Bloomingdale, supra
note 93 at 436: "Section 54 makes it clear now that corporate existence com-
mences upon the completion of the dual requirement of filing and recording."
97. See note 15 supra. In addition, since Nebraska did not enact a statute similar
to section 146 of the MODEL ACT, there would be no statutory mandate of joint
and several liability for "corporate" acts prior to legal existence.
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shall become effective. There is doubt today as to whether this should be
done. The Secretary of State's office is asked every day for a certificate as
to whether or not a corporation is in good standing. It is possible that the
incorporators failed to file their articles of incorporation in the county
court house and it may be in jeopardy if it is not done.9 8
Senator Luedtke's statement typifies the reason for criticizing the
de facto doctrine:99 its unpredictability.
Although it is unclear whether the possible confusion in the du-
al filing system led to its change, 00 section 21-2054 was amended in
1965 to read as it does today: "Upon the filing and recording in the
office of the Secretary of State of the original of the articles of in-
corporation, corporate existence shall commence."1 01 The statutes
continue to require the filing of a duplicate copy of the articles of
incorporation with the county clerk 102 however, this is not made a
condition precedent to corporate existence.10 3 It is clear that it
would not be possible to file first with the county clerk as that copy
98. Comm. on Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 173, Neb. Leg., 73d Sess. 3 (Feb. 11, 1963)
(remarks by Mr. Roland Luedtke) (emphasis added).
99. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
100. Comm. on Judiciary, Comm Statement on L.B. 877, Neb. Leg., 75th Sess.
(April 28, 1965): "Legislative Bill 877 merely reinstates some matter inadver-
tently omitted when a new Business Corporation Act was passed in 1963 and
makes other refinements in the statutes in order to harmonize one section
with another." See also Comm. on Judiciary Minutes, L.B. 877, Neb. Leg., 75th
Sess. 2-3 (April 27, 1965) (remarks by Mr. Warren C. Johnson):
These amendments will basically do two things. They get rid of the
real question of duplications. For instance, [a new company] had to
go to two or three different places to get their Articles signed, then
they only sent one copy-technically, under the old law, you could
not file a duplicate copy, or [only?] duplicate original. This new com-
pany couldn't start in Nebraska until they went over to get these new
papers signed.
This statement, however, does not explain why dual filing as condition prece-
dent to corporate existence was repealed. If the only problem was one of
duplicates, the statute could have simply been amended to allow the filing of
a duplicate copy with the county clerk.
101. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2054 (Reissue 1977).
102. Id. § 21-2053.
The articles of incorporation shall be signed by each incorporator.
The original and a duplicate copy of the articles of incorporation shall
be delivered to the Secretary of State, who shall, when all fees pro-
vided by law shall have been paid:
(1) File the original in this office; and
(2) Return to the incorporators or their representative the
duplicate copy, stamped with the date of filing in the office of the
Secretary of State.
The duplicate copy of the articles of incorporation bearing the
date of filing in the office of the Secretary of State shall be recorded
in the office of the county clerk of the county where the registered
office of the corporation is located in this state.
103. The state could require the corporation to file with the county clerk, but this
would not be a challenge to its legal existence. See notes 71-72 supra.
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must bear an indication of its prior recording with the secretary of
state. Therefore, the situation could not exist in which the court
might feel compelled to find a de facto corporation where the incor-
porators had filed only with the county clerk.104
Similarly, section 21-20,125 imposes a publication requirement
upon corporations. 105 This too is not designated as a condition pre-
cedent to corporate existence. In addition, that statute provides
that any subsequent publication will relate back to cure any "inva-
lid" corporate acts.10 6 Thus, although other requirements may be
imposed upon a corporation, they are conditions subsequent to le-
gal existence; 0 7 only the filing and recording of the articles of in-
corporation with the secretary of state is a condition precedent to
corporate existence.
Section 21-2054 differs from section 56 of the Model Act in three
respects. First, section 56 states that issuance of the certificate of
incorporation acts as conclusive evidence that all conditions prece-
dent to incorporation have been performed. Section 21-2054, on the
other hand, does not specifically state whether the filing and re-
cording of the articles of incorporation acts as evidence of compli-
ance with all conditions precedent. 08 Prior to the 1963 revision,
section 21-108 provided that articles of incorporation, duly certified
by the secretary of state and the county clerk, acted as evidence of
104. Note, however, the possibility of the articles being accepted by the secretary
of state but not recorded through some oversight. The court might feel com-
pelled to protect the shareholder from liability and would hold the act of filing
alone was sufficient to constitute a bona fide attempt to comply. Even under
this remote possibility, however a Model Act analysis would require filing
and recording for corporate existence.
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,125 (Reissue 1977).
In the event any notice required to be given pursuant to this section
is not given, but is subsequently published for the required time, and
proof of the publication thereof is filed in the office of the Secretary
of State and in the office of the county clerk.., the acts of such
corporation prior to, as well as after, such publication shall be valid.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if a private litigant attempted to challenge
the existence of a corporation for its failure to publish notice of incorporation,
any publication after the suit was instituted would relate back and render the
action moot.
106. Id.
107. See also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-301 to -304 (Reissue 1977) (annual report). But
see Elson v. Schmidt, 136 Neb. 778, 287 N.W. 196 (1939) (subscription of the
capital stock is a condition precedent to corporate existence). Under the
present laws, however, and in the absence of a provision in the articles of
incorporation stating that subscription of all stock is a condition precedent to
existence, whether the stock is subscribed or not should not affect corporate
existence. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2052 (Reissue 1977) (contents of the arti-
cles of incorporation).
108. Cf. 2 MODEL AcT ANN. § 56, T 2. 1, at 205-06 (Comment) (articles of incorpora-
tion in Nebraska act "as evidence" of corporate existence).
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incorporation. 10 9 It is fair to assume today that filing and recording
the articles of incorporation act, at least, as evidence of incorpora-
tion. Otherwise, proof of corporate existence would be impossible.
Although it is often emphasized that section 56 of the Model Act
renders issuance of the certificate of incorporation conclusive evi-
dence, this aspect should not play a role in determining whether
the de facto doctrine is eliminated. The import of section 56 is that
corporate existence commences only upon issuance of the certifi-
cate. Because this is all that is required, anything short of ob-
taining the certificate would not constitute a bona fide attempt to
organize." 0
Second, section 56 of the Model Act requires issuance of a cer-
tificate of incorporation. This implies some discretionary review of
corporate articles and/or acts prior in time to insure that all the
conditions precedent have been met."' Section 21-2054 requires
only filing and recording of the articles of incorporation which, on
its face, might imply that only a clerical function is involved in the
Nebraska system." 2 However, this implication is false." 3 The ar-
ticles of incorporation are accepted for filing and recording only
after a review which reveals compliance with all the information
required by section 21-2052." 4 In addition, all fees must be paid
before filing. 1 5
Third, section 56 of the Model Act specifies the right of the state
to cancel or revoke the corporation's certificate of incorporation.
Thus, de jure status is complete upon the issuance of the certifi-
cate," 6 but the corporation may be involuntarily dissolved under
section 94 for failure to pay its franchise tax, to file the annual re-
port, to appoint and maintain a registered agent in the state, to file
notice of change of the registered office, and for procuring the arti-
cles of incorporation through fraud. 1 7 Although this caveat is not
contained in section 21-2054, other Nebraska laws provide for invol-
109. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-108 (Reissue 1962) (repealed by LB. 173, ch. 98,1963 Neb.
Laws).
110. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra. Similarly, since corporate exist-
ence in Nebraska begins upon filing and recording the articles of incorpora-
tion, any action taken short of this minimal condition precedent would not
seem to constitute a bona fide attempt to organize.
111. See 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 55, at 197 ("[i]f the Secretary of State finds that the
articles of incorporation conform to law").
112. Moldenhauer, Advantages of the New Nebraska Business Corporation Act
and Changes From the Previous Law, 43 NEB. L. REV. 303, 314 (1964).
113. Letter from Corporate Division, Secretary of State's Office, to Robert Rieke
(Jan. 23, 1979).
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2052 (Reissue 1977).
115. Id. § 21-2053.
116. 2 MODEL AcT ANN. § 56, 2., at 205 (Comment).
117. 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 94, at 531.
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untary dissolution for failure to file the annual report" 8 and for
procuring the articles of incorporation through fraud, or exceeding
or abusing the authority conferred by law.119
The Nebraska corporation laws, like the Model Act, contain no
specific statute in regard to the corporation by estoppel doctrine.
20
This has not always been true. As early as 1873, the defense of
'"want of legal organization" was not allowed.
No body of men acting as a corporation under the provisions of this subdi-
vision, shall be permitted to set up the want of legal organization as a de-
fense to any action brought against them, as a corporation; nor shall any
person sued on a contract made with such corporation, or for an injury to
the property of such corporation, be permitted to set up the want of legal
organization in a defense of such an action.
1 2 1
The italicized portions of the statute indicate that it literally ap-
plied only in the first two of the three typical situations: where a
defective corporation is being sued and attempts to deny its own
legal existence, and where a third party is being sued and attempts
to deny the legal existence of the corporate plaintiff.12 2 For this
reason, and the fact that the Model Act does not contain a like pro-
vision,123 the failure to reinact the above statute should not be con-
sidered indicative of the legislature's intention concerning the
corporation by estoppel doctrine.
B. The Nebraska Supreme Court's Position on the De Facto Doctrine
The Nebraska Supreme Court has long recognized the doctrine
of de facto corporations. In Abbott v. Omaha Smelting & Refining
Co.,124 the plaintiff creditor sought to hold Abbott individually lia-
ble for a corporate debt, claiming he was in reality a co-partner in
118. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-301, -313 (Reissue 1977).
119. Id. § 21-2093.
120. Id. § 21-2006 (defense of ultra vires; discussed at note 13 supra).
121. NEB. STAT. ch. 11, § 144 (1873) (emphasis added) (want of legal organization,
no defense) (repealed L.B. 250, 1941 Neb. Laws, ch. 41, § 89). For cases apply-
ing the statute, see note 38 supra. In 1941, the statute was amended and the
title changed to "Ultra Vires; no defense, when." See note 40 supra. The first
sentence of the amended statute remained substantially identical to the 1873
statute cited in the text. Query whether the added second sentence leaves
open the option of a plaintiff creditor challenging the existence of the corpo-
ration in an action to hold the individual shareholders liable or relates in-
stead to challenging corporate acts or powers. See N. LTrm, supra note 9, at
199 (the additional sentence supports conclusion that the former type of suit
was contemplated).
122. See notes 36-40 supra. See also N. LA=m, supra note 9, at 199: These provi-
sions are "badly framed... if ... meant to cover the case of a suit by a
person transacting business with the supposed corporation against the indi-
vidual members of the defectively formed corporation."
123. The Nebraska act was patterned after the Model Act. See note 96 supra.
124. 4 Neb. 416 (1876).
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an association. One defense asserted was the existence of a de
facto corporation. Abbott and others had executed articles of in-
corporation, elected officers, and transacted business as a corpora-
tion.125 The corporation statutes at that time required filing the
articles of incorporation with the county clerk before the "com-
mencement of business.' 26 Unlike present Nebraska laws, there
was no statute expressly providing when corporate "existence"
commenced. Former section 132 did, however, provide that a cor-
poration would be "valid" if the articles were filed with both the
county clerk and the secretary of state and if notice of incorpora-
tion was published.127 It is obvious that statutes requiring numer-
ous conditions precedent to a "valid" corporation offered fertile
ground for the application of the de facto doctrine. In Abbott, how-
ever, the corporation had not fied its articles of incorporation with
either the county clerk or the secretary of state. In defining a de
facto corporation,128 the court did not include the "bona fide at-
tempt to organize" element; 2 9 however, its decision recognized
that the failure to file the articles precluded both a de jure and a de
facto corporation:
[I]f the articles of incorporation are not filed in the office of the county
clerk, the parties acting in the matter do not bring themselves within the
purview of the statute, because the filing of the articles as required, is a
condition precedent to the existence of the corporate franchise, or corpo-
rate powers in any respect whatever; this prerequisite, I think, must be
complied with'13 0
125. Id. at 418-19.
126. NEB. STAT. ch. 11, § 126 (1873) (repealed L.B. 250, 1941 Neb. Laws, ch. 41, § 89):
Every corporation, previous to the commencement of any business,
except its own organization, when the same is not formed by legisla-
tive enactment, must adopt articles of incorporation, and have them
recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county or counties in
which the business is to be transacted, in a book kept for that pur-
pose.
127. NEB. STAT. ch. 11, § 132 (1873) (emphasis added) (repealed L.B. 250, 1491 Neb.
Laws, ch. 41, § 89).
Any corporation formed without legislative enactment, may com-
mence business as soon as its articles of incorporation are filed by the
county clerks of the counties, as required by this subdivision, and
shall be valid, if a copy of its articles be filed in the office of the secre-
tary of state, and the notice required to be published within four
months from the time of filing such articles in the clerk's office.
128. 4 Neb. at 420 ("[I1t is necessary to show the existence of a charter, or some
law under which the assumed powers are claimed to be conferred, and the
user of the franchise claimed under such charter or law.").
129. See text accompanying note 15 supra. But see IJ. Hughes Co. v. Farmers
Union Produce Co., 110 Neb. 736, 739, 194 N.W. 872, 873 (1923) ('"e syllabus of
the Abbott case ... omits the element of an attempt, at least colorable, to
comply with the statute, but the opinion and the cases cited recognize the
necessity of such an attempt, as by filing the articles.").
130. 4 Neb. at 422.
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In addition, the court relied on section 139 as further evidence
that filing the articles of incorporation was a condition precedent
to corporate existence. Section 139 provided that "[i]f any corpo-
ration fail to comply, substantially, with the provisions of this sub-
division, in relation to giving notice, and other requisitions of
organization, the property of all the stockholders shall be liable for
the corporate debts.' 131 The court questioned why section 139 im-
posed liability for failure to give notice and other requirements,
but not for failing to file the articles of incorporation. "Perhaps the
only satisfactory answer to the question is that, according to the
legislative intent, no corporate franchise or power exists until the
articles are filed as required.' 32 This somewhat confusing use of
section 139 as a basis for the court's decision was clarified in Globe
Publishing Co. v. State Bank of Nebraska.133 The court there
stated that the result in Abbott did not depend on any interpreta-
tion of section 139. The liability of the shareholders was based on
the common law.'3 4
In Abbott, the articles of incorporation had not been filed with
either the county clerk or the secretary of state. The application of
the de facto doctrine when the articles are filed in only one of the
above places is illustrated by Kleckner v. Turk. 135 There the plain-
tiff depositor attempted to recover from the shareholders of a
banking corporation. Plaintiff asserted that the corporation did not
exist because the articles of incorporation were not filed with the
secretary of state as required by section 132.136 The court held, in
accordance with Abbott, that sections 126 and 132 imposed a condi-
tion precedent to corporate existence, 37 yet held that in filing with
the county clerk "the conditions precedent had been per-
131. NEB. STAT. ch. 11, § 139 (1873) (repealed L.B. 250, 1941 Neb. Laws, ch. 41, § 89).
Similarly, NEB. STAT. ch. 11, § 136 (1873) (repealed L.B. 250, 1941 Neb. Laws,
ch. 41, § 89), imposed joint and several liability on the shareholders for the
failure of the corporation to publish annual notice of existing debts.
132. 4 Neb. 416 at 422.
133. 41 Neb. 175, 59 N.W. 683 (1894).
134. Id. at 188-89, 191, 59 N.W. at 687-88:
Where a statute provides that until certain things are done by per-
sons forming a corporation, such as the filing of its articles of associa-
tion in the office of a public officer, the stockholders in such
corporation shall be liable for the debts thereof, such a statute is only
declaratory of the common law....
... [TIhe conclusion reached in [Abbott] resulted not alone from
the statute, but could and would have been the same had no statute
on the subject existed.
135. 45 Neb. 176, 63 N.W. 469 (1895).
136. See note 127 supra.
137. 45 Neb. at 186, 63 N.W. at 471 ("It seems to have been contemplated by the
lawmakers that the acts prescribed by [sections 126 and 132] must precede
the commencement of the existence of the corporation as an organization.").
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formed."'3 8 A de facto corporation resulted since filing the articles
of incorporation was held, in effect, to be the only condition prece-
dent to corporate existence that would constitute a bona fide at-
tempt to organize. 39
Subsequent to the above decisions, section 126140 was amended
to place primary focus on a state filing. As amended, section 126
required that the articles of incorporation be ified with the secre-
tary of state and, in addition, required that domestic corporations
file with the county clerk, all before the "commencement of busi-
ness."'14 The first case to explore the possible effect of the new
dual filing requirement prior to the "commencement of business"
was Lusk v. Riggs.142 The court originally held that although the
corporation's articles had been filed with the county clerk, section
126 now required filing with the secretary of state and "[u]ntil
such filing was had the company, under the terms of [section 126],
was not authorized to transact business."' 43 Therefore, even a de
facto corporation could not exist.'4 One might logically infer that
section 126 was amended to harmonize with section 132 in defining
what acts were necessary to achieve the status of a "valid" corpo-
ration. Dual filing might, therefore, become a condition precedent
to corporate existence and thereby negate the confusion of the ear-
lier statutes. On rehearing, however, the court found that section
132 had not been amended or repealed and still provided that a
corporation could commence business when its articles of incorpo-
ration were filed with the county clerk. The court held that this
filing would still be the only condition precedent to corporate exist-
ence.
138. Id. at 187, 63 N.W. at 471. At the same time the court noted that all conditions,
precedent and subsequent, must be complied with to constitute a de jure cor-
poration. Query whether under this definition the de facto doctrine could be
eliminated, or whether the label of "de facto" has merely been changed to "de
jure" with the right of the state to challenge legal existence.
139. The court made no mention of that part of section 132 which required dual
filing to achieve the status of a "valid" corporation. See note 127 supra.
140. See note 126 supra.
141. NEB. STAT. ch. 16, § 126 (1897) (repealed L.B. 250, 1941 Neb. Laws, ch. 41, § 89).
Every corporation, previous to the commencement of any business,
except its own organization, .when the same is not formed by legisla-
tive enactment, must adopt articles of incorporation, and have them
filed in the office of the secretary of state and recorded in a book kept
for that purpose, and domestic corporations must also file with the
county clerk in the county where their headquarters are located
142. 70 Neb. 713, 97 N.W. 1033 (1904), rev'd on rehearing, 70 Neb. 718, 102 N.W. 88
(1905).
143. Id. at 717, 97 N.W. at 1034.
144. Id. "[A] corporation can not be deemed to exist, even de facto, where the
adventurers never had any charter at all."
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[I]n view of the apparent existence of the two sections of the statute, it
may be said that the [corporation] has colorably complied with the re-
quirements of the law, and this is all that is necessary to show to consti-
tute it a defacto corporation, and secure it against a collateral attack. 14 5
Thus, although it appeared that filing the articles of incorpora-
tion with either the county clerk or the secretary of state would
constitute a bona fide attempt to organize under the new statutes,
filing in neither place was again held in H.J. Hughes Co. v. Farmers
Union Produce Co.14 to preclude application of the de facto doc-
trine. In Hughes, the defendant shareholders introduced evidence
which showed adoption of the corporate constitution and by-laws,
the election of directors and officers, the holding of meetings with
corporate minutes, and business transactions carried on in the cor-
porate name. However, because the articles of incorporation were
never filed, there was a failure of a condition precedent to exist-
ence and thus no bona fide attempt to organize:
[T]he filing of the articles... is the first step to initiate a franchise. Up to
the filing of the articles the power and authority of the state is not invoked,
and the body has not received the breath of life necessary to its existence
as a legal entity, defective or perfect.14 7
The brief summary of Nebraska case law above indicates that
under previous statutes, filing the articles of incorporation in at
least one location was a condition precedent to corporate exist-
ence, and necessary to achieve the bona fide attempt element
under a traditional de facto doctrine analysis. The confusion as to
corporate "existence" was brought about through the ambiguous
"commencement of business" and "valid" wording of the stat-
utes,14 which was not clarified until the 1963 revision.149 Other re-
quirements under the previous statutes, such as posting of by-laws
and annual publication of debts, were held to be conditions subse-
quent to corporate existence. The absence of a clear statute show-
ing when corporate existence commenced allowed the courts to
make use of the de facto doctrine when they felt it improper to
hold the shareholders individually liable.
C. The Nebraska Supreme Court's Position on the Corporation by
Estoppel Doctrine
The Nebraska Supreme Court has yet to clearly recognize and
apply the corporation by estoppel doctrine where a creditor of a
145. Id. at 721, 102 N.W. at 89.
146. 110 Neb. 736, 194 N.W. 872 (1923).
147. Id. at 740, 194 N.W. at 874. Accord, Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley,
57 F. Supp. 915 (D. Neb. 1944).
148. See notes 93, 126-27, 131 supra.
149. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2054 (Reissue 1977). See text accompanying notes 96-106
supra.
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defective corporation attempts, after recognizing and dealing with
the corporation as a corporation, to hold the shareholders liable for
a corporate debt. Early case law indicates that a corporation by
estoppel would not be recognized if a de facto corporation was not
found to exist,150 or at least the doctrines were confused and
merged together.151 One such example, however, revealed the ra-
tionale of the corporation by estoppel doctrine. In Kleckner v.
Turk,15 2 the court recognized that the creditor dealt with the cor-
poration without a thought or expectation of holding the individual
shareholders liable and the shareholders, in turn, did not agree,
intend, or contemplate that they would be held liable. To hold the
shareholder liable would be creating, in effect, a new and different
contract.153
The court's attitude was indicated by its decision in Nebraska
National Bank of York v. Ferguson.154 There a creditor attempted
to hold the shareholders liable for the debts of a corporation. The
articles of incorporation had been filed with the county clerk but
not with the secretary of state. It thus appears that a de facto cor-
poration could have been found to exist. 55 There was no doubt
that the creditor recognized and dealt with the corporation as a
corporation; 15 6 in fact, the creditor had previously brought suit and
obtained a judgment against the corporation. It was this earlier
judgment that proved to be the deciding factor. The court stated it
was unnecessary to determine whether a de facto corporation ex-
isted.157 Assuming no de jure or de facto corporation, the plaintiff
was estopped to deny the existence of the corporation by bringing
an action and obtaining a judgment against it. Moreover, and more
important to the scope of this comment since a judgment will not
usually be first obtained against a defective corporation, the court
stated, in dicta: "In addition to the recovery of judgments against
the [corporation] upon the indebtedness made the foundation of
150. Abbott v. Omaha Smelting & Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416, 423 (1876) ("[P]ersons
who have contracted in writing with such an association, without any color of
franchise, are not estopped from denying its corporate capacity.").
151. Kleckner v. Turk, 45 Neb. 176, 189, 63 N.W. 469, 472 (1895) ("[P]ersons who
have contracted with a defacto corporation ... as did the plaintiff, and thus
recognized and acknowledged its existence as a corporation, may not after-
ward be heard to deny its corporate capacity...
152. 45 Neb. 176, 63 N.W. 469 (1895).
153. Id. at 187-88, 63 N.W. at 472.
154. 49 Neb. 109, 68 N.W. 370 (1896).
155. See text "companying notes 135-39 supra.
156. All notes had been signed, "York Butter and Cheese Company, by F.A. Bid-
well, president, J.D. White, Secretary." 49 Neb. at 112, 68 N.W. at 371.
157. Id. at 113, 68 N.W. at 372. See also Crete Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Patz, 1 Neb.
Unoff. 768,95 N.W. 793 (1901) (use of estoppel without necessity of finding a de
facto corporation).
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this suit, plaintiff actually dealt with said company as a corpora-
tion, and therefore its corporate existence cannot be assailed by
plaintiff in this action."'158
The most cogent statement of the corporation by estoppel doc-
trine where a creditor attempts to sue the shareholders of a defec-
tive corporation was offered by the court in American Gas
Construction Co. v. Lisco:15 9 "When a party contracts with an im-
perfectly organized corporation, he is estopped to deny its corpo-
rate existence and is precluded from recovering from its members
individually as if they were partners."'16 However, the facts of the
case indicate that the court's holding was incorrectly applied. An
action was brought by a corporate creditor to recover the balance
due on a contract executed between the corporation and the de-
fendant individual.' 6' The defendant attempted to set off the con-
tract sued upon with one executed between himself and a
shareholder/officer of the plaintiff corporation. To accomplish this
result, the defendant asserted that the corporation's legal exist-
ence had expired prior to the execution of the contract. The court
was faced with a situation which merely required the literal appli-
cation of section 24-221: "[N] or shall any person sued on a contract
made with such corporation ... be permitted to set up the want of
legal organization in defense of such action.' 62
The paucity of Nebraska case law concerning the corporation
by estoppel doctrine where a creditor attempts to hold the share-
holders liable makes a conclusion difficult. Besides the confusion
of the early cases,163 procedural considerations have sometimes
precluded consideration of the issue. For example, in H. Hughes
Co. v. Farmers Union Produce Co.,' 64 the court refused to consider
the shareholders' defense that the creditor had contracted with the
corporation and was now estopped from denying its existence be-
cause a general denial was held insufficient to plead the defense. 165
It appears that the corporation by estoppel doctrine has been rec-
ognized by the Nebraska courts when the shareholders are being
sued, but has yet to be fully applied to preclude a creditor who has
intended to and believed he was contracting with a validly formed
158. 49 Neb. at 114, 68 N.W. at 372 (dicta).
159. 122 Neb. 607, 241 N.W. 89 (1932).
160. Id. at 609, 241 N.W. at 90 (emphasis added) (citing Nebraska Nat'l Bank of
York).
161. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
162. NEB. Comp. STAT. § 24-221 (1929) (repealed).
163. See text accompanying notes 150-52 supra.
164. 110 Neb. 736, 194 N.W. 872 (1923). See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
165. Similarly, by making the corporation a party defendant, corporate existence
is recognized by the plaintiff. Baum v. Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197, 62
N.W.2d 864 (1954).
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corporation from holding the shareholders individually liable.166
V. CONCLUSION
For the first time in Nebraska statutory history, the corporation
laws contain a provision expressly stating when "corporate exist-
ence" shall commence. Under previous statutes, other conditions
precedent, such as dual filing and recording of the articles of incor-
poration and notice of incorporation by publication, were required
to achieve the status of a "valid" corporation, yet not all were re-
quired before'the "commencement of business."' 67 These statutes
presented a problem for the courts and led them to make use of
the de facto doctrine but, in so doing, to always hold that a de facto
corporation could not result unless the articles of incorporation
were filed with either the secretary of state or the county clerk.168
Section 21-2054 has put to rest any need for the de facto doctrine in
Nebraska today. Filing and recording the articles with the state is
the only condition precedent to corporate existence. No act short
of this could be sufficient to constitute a bona fide attempt to incor-
porate, and once this is done the association achieves the status of
a de jure corporation. Stated differently, if the court persists in
using the label "de facto" for corporations which have not also
complied with conditions subsequent, 16 9 at least the problem in-
herent in the de facto doctrine is eliminated. Before the articles
are fied and recorded with the state, the shareholder is liable.
While elimination of the de facto doctrine has been brought
about through statutory change, the same cannot be said for the
corporation by estoppel doctrine. First, because Nebraska laws do
not contain a provision imposing joint and several liability on
those who act as a corporation without authority from the state,
there is no legislative intent concerning its elimination. 170 There-
fore, the court must decide whether it would be equitable to allow
a creditor of a defective corporation to hold the shareholders lia-
ble. Here it will be important for the court to separate the different
situations in which the corporation by estoppel doctrine is typi-
cally applied.17 1 The equitable arguments that have been
presented apply only where a creditor is attempting to sue the
166. Because the corporation by estoppel doctrine is an equitable one, the courts'
failure to apply it in some situations may be due to its determination, without
explanation, that it would yield an inequitable result. See note 49 & accompa-
nying text supra.
167. See notes 126-27 & accompanying text supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 124-30 & 146-47 supra.
169. See note 138 supra.
170. See 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 146 (quoted at note 61 supra).
171. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
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shareholders. Any broad holding by the court that the corporation
by estoppel doctrine has been eliminated will result in confusion,
as illustrated by the District of Columbia cases. 172
Second, assuming the court takes the position that the creditor
should be able to recover from someone when he contracts with a
defective corporation that subsequently becomes insolvent-be it
officers, directors, or shareholders173-- does the fact that Nebraska
has no statute similar to section 146 of the Model Act preclude
elimination of the doctrine? It is submitted it does not.
The absence of a Nebraska provision similar to section 146 al-
lows the courts to retain its discretionary power to apply the corpo-
ration by estoppel doctrine, and it is evident that it is not firmly
entrenched in Nebraska case law. The doctrine has been recog-
nized in few decisions, and has yet to be correctly applied. In rele-
vant situations, procedural grounds have precluded its
consideration. Similar to holding that a corporation by estoppel
cannot result unless a de facto corporation exists, these decisions
may actually reflect a rejection of the doctrine on the part of the
courts. 1 74
This comment has examined how other jurisdictions have
treated the de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel doc-
trines under statutes similar to those of Nebraska. It has at-
tempted to provide the practitioner with, perhaps, an alternate
theory of liability when representing a creditor who had contracted
with a corporation at a time when its articles of incorporation had
not yet been filed with the state and which has since become insol-
vent.175
Robert Rieke '79
172. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
173. See note 8 supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 79 & 91 supra.
175. See Comment, supra note 35.
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